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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal from the Order of the Third 
I 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County by Judge Pat B. Brian 
upholding the Final Order of the Utah Securities Advisory Board 
(•SAB") and the Executive Director of the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation ("Executive Director" and "Department") 
suspending all secondary trading exemptions of the stock of 
Amenityf Inc. ("Amenity"). Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(a), as 
an appeal from the District Court's review (of the „final order of 
a state agency. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether appellant has met its burden relative to 
the applicable standard of review of the decision of the 
Department; to wit: 
A. Whether the Department•s findings of fact that 
Amenity circumvented or evaded the registr 
Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") by) 
ation provisions of the 
distributing 
approximately 90f000 shares of its stock to 900 individuals by 
e Division is so 
ary and capricious, 
gift without registering the stock with tY\( 
without foundation in fact as to be arbiti 
B. Whether the Department's conclusion that a 
distribution of securities as indicated above constitutes an 
"offer or sale" of a security is reasonable and rational; and, 
C. Whether the Department's conclusion that 
Amenity failed to establish that the above-outlined distribution 
of stock qualified as a "good faith gift"! excepted from the 
definition of offer and sale and, hence from registration, was 
unreasonable or irrational. 
2. Whether the Utah Securities Division ("Division") 
and the Department have authority to suspend all trading 
exemptions of a security. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These proceedings were initiated pursuant to a 
Petition, dated June 5, 1986 wherein the Utah Securities Division 
alleged that the distribution of stock in a corporation 
incorporated in the State of Utah on January 7, 1986, Amenity, 
Incf, was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7. (R. 28) The 
petition sought the suspension of all possible exemptions for 
further trading of Amenity stock without registration pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3). M*. 
Memoranda were filed by the parties outlining their 
positions, and on September 25, 1986, a hearing was held before 
J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge (MALJM). Id. Mr. 
Eklund issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order on October 28, 1986. (R. 32) On January 8, 
1987, the SAB and the Executive Director issued an Order adopting 
limited provisions of Mr. Eklund9s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, but specifically rejecting the ALJ's 
determination regarding the issue of whom the registration 
provisions are to protect, and his determinations concerning 
whether the disposition of Amenity stock constituted a good faith 
gift* (R. 22-25) (Any reference by appellant to portions of the 
ALJ's findings or conclusions is reference to only a proposed 
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finding or conclusion, and carries no weight lor authority. See 
page 7.) The January 8th Order of the Department called for an 
evidentiary hearing to be held on January 201 1987, for the 
limited purpose of receiving evidence as to whether the 
distribution of Amenity stock was an effort to frustrate or 
circumvent the registration provisions of the Act, and the Ordej 
enumerated certain factors that should be addressed in making 
such a determination. (R. 24, 25) 
On January 20, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., 
before the SAB. After consideration of the 
a hearing was held 
(evidence produced at 
the January 20th hearing, the SAB and the Executive Director 
ding the use of all issued an Order on February 18, 1987, suspen 
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc., 
its affiliates and successors. (R. 13). 
On April 16, 1987, Capital General Corporation appealed 
the Order to the District Court for review asking the court to 
set aside the February 18th Order. The District Court conducted 
a hearing on September 17, 1987 and, after reviewing the briefs 
on file and examining the administrative proceedings, upheld the 
Final Order of the Department. (R. 108) 
Capital General Corporation now appeals the matter to 
this Court. 
ffote PP ftccyrecy Of The Record 
Court, appellant makes a claim that the rec 
is not accurate or complete because such fa 
hearing was held on June 19, 1986 where the 
stipulated to a set of facts. Appellant th 
In its Brief with this 
lord of this case below 
ils to indicate that a 
parties allegedly 
en enumerates a set of 
3 -
facts it claims are the facts Amenity and the Division stipulated 
to in the alleged hearing before the Division on June 19, 1986. 
Appellant Brief at 3-5. Also, in footnote 1 on page 4f appellant 
indicates it does not believe the respondents will deny its 
stipulation "because to do so would throw yet another error in 
the proceedings . • ••" 
While it is unclear why appellant would be making these 
allegations unless it is attempting to restrict the Division to a 
more favorable "set of stipulated facts," nevertheless, appellant 
makes no claims that the facts reviewed by the judicial bodies in 
this case are in violation of any "stipulation," or that any 
other tacts besides its "stipulated facts" are not properly 
before this Court for its review. Nonetheless, appellant takes 
issue with any disavowal the Division might make concerning any 
stipulation. 
Counsel for the Division on this appeal was not counsel 
at the administrative level and is unaware of any alleged 
stipulation, nor are any documents filed with the Division 
indicating any alleged stipulation was agreed upon by parties. 
Most importantly, there is no indication in the record that any 
hearing was held on June 19, 1986. The original Petition filed 
by the Division against Amenity attached a Notice of Action that 
indicated a hearing was scheduled for June 19, 1986, however, no 
hearing ever took place on that date. (R. 28, 75) Thus, the 
Division denies any stipulated set of facts were arrived at 
between parties during any hearing on the above date. 
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ecord at the hearing. 
as to the accurate 
s the issue of any 
If appellant believes that a stipulation was 
consummated between parties indicating that a particular set of 
facts was to be before the Department, appellant should have 
objected to the facts considered by the judicial bodies as being 
outside the scope of any stipulation! or alternatively, should 
have entered the "stipulated facts1- on the 
No where in appellant's memoranda filed with the Division does it 
raise this issue* In fact, in appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Memorandum of the Division filed with the 
Department on August 7, 1986, (two months after the alleged June 
19 bearing,) appellant discusses its belief 
facts before the Department and never raise| 
stipulated set of facts. (R. 42) 
The Division has no desire to haggle over this alleged 
problem. If there truly was a stipulated set of factsf the 
Division would willingly accept whatever impact that may have on 
the case. However, there is nothing to reflect any such 
stipulation or set of facts. This whole matter is in fact a moot 
issue because the Department held its own evidentiary hearing 
wherein evidence beyond that indicated in appellant's litany was 
received to address additional matters. And, the evidentiary 
proceeding was not objected to by appellan 
with any legal tenacity because administra 
be conducted with flexibility, informality 
liberally construed and easily amended, gbe pilcher v. State 
Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)* 
t nor could it do so 
^ive proceedings are to 
and are to be 
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If appellant does not believe the record accurately 
reflects the facts and proceedings below, appellant is welcome to 
litigate the issue and have the record set straight. The 
Division would appreciate any proper supplement to the record if 
it is not fully accurate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amenity, Inc. was incorporated in the State of Utah on 
January 7, 1986. (R. 28) On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares 
of Amenity stock were issued to Capital General Corporation (CGC) 
in exchange for $2,000.00 cash. Id. At least two of the officers 
and directors of CGC were incorporators and directors of Amenity, 
l&i. The $2,000.00 received from CGC was the only asset of 
Amenity at the time of the filing of the Division's petition, ld^ 
After receiving the 1,000,000 shares of stock, CGC 
issued 100 shares of stock to approximately 900 different 
individuals and organizations. (R. 29) Those who received stock 
were people who had invested with CGC in the past, and friends 
and relatives of the principles of CGC. IJLI. According to CGC, 
the purpose of the stock distribution was to reward past 
association and loyalty, and the general exposure of CGC's 
financial consulting business to persons in the financial world. 
Id. In other words, the purpose, according to CGC, was the 
creation and/or maintenance of goodwill. Id. CGC retained the 
remaining 910,000 shares of Amenity stock. Amenity did not file 
a registration statement prior to the distribution of the shares. 
CGC engaged in a major campaign of incorporating over 
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301 other companies and causing them to go public by distributing 
its shares to a wide range of shareholders in a similar fashion 
I 
to Amenity. (R. 18) In the summer of 1986, Amenity Inc. was 
acquired by Elkin Weiss and Companies Inc. Id. Two of the 30 
additional companies have also been acquired 
Enterprises, now Florida Growth Industries, 
now H & B Carriers, Inc. Id. 
CGC was instrumental in the acquisition of Amenity, 
Olympus, and Y travel by the acquiring companies and received 
They are Olympus 
line, and ¥ Travel, 
Jd. QGC maintained 
the time of the 
$25,000.00 for its role in each acquisition. 
300,000 shares of stock in Elkin Weiss. At 
hearing in January, Elkin Weiss1 unrestricted stock was trading 
for around $3.00 a share. (R. 118 Transcript at 27) The 
Department thus found that the purpose of the distribution of 
Amenity stock was to circumvent or evade thje Act and the 
registration provisions contained therein. (R. 18) 
On page 8 of his brief, appellant! refers to a finding 
by the ALJ that the gift of stock by Amenity was made in good 
faith. Appellant's reference to the finding by the ALJ carries 
no weight or authority since the determination by the ALJ is only 
* In fact, CGC incorporated approximately 
caused them to go public in the fashion de 
exact number was not known to the Division 
hearings, however, another case has been f 
Department concerning the other 47 compani 
concerning that case is pending. See, In 
Admin. Case No. 97-09-28-01 (filed Dec. 1, 
interesting to note that, at the district 
claimed that the number of companies invol 
overstated by the SAB and that it was in e 
Brief at 15) The truth is that the SAB un 
companies involved by 17. 
148 companies and 
gcribed above. The 
at the time of the 
led with the 
s, and a decision 
e H&B Carrier?, et al. 
1987). It is 
court, appellant 
ed in the scheme was 
ror. (Disrict Court 
erstated the number of 
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a proposal that must be affirmed or adopted by the SAB and the 
Executive Director. U.C.A. § 61-1-14(3). Unless the Department 
adopts the ALJ's findings and conclusions, the determinations by 
the ALJ are without any effect whatever. Thus, appellant's claim 
that the finding of the ALJ that the gifts were made in good 
faith is misleading and improper. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The standard of review is whether the Department Order is 
arbitrary and capricious. 
This Court reviews the administrative decision rather 
than the district court's order. Appellant has the burden to 
show that the administrative Order was arbitrary, capricious, 
irrational and unreasonable in order for this Court to overturn 
the decision. Mere difference of opinion concerning the 
correctness or propriety of the decision is not sufficient to 
overturn it. The Order by the Department suspending all trading 
exemptions was arrived at in a rational, analytically 
satisfactory manner as evidenced by statutory and common law, and 
the findings of the Department were based upon substantial, 
competent evidence. 
The law applicable in this case is Mspecial law," as 
defined by case law, and the SAB is required to apply its 
technical expertise in interpreting such law in order to render 
its decision. The law requires reviewing courts to apply great 
deference to such technical expertise. 
Appellant has failed to meet its burden of proof to 
show error by the administrative agency, and therefore, this 
Court must uphold the Department's decision because it was 
rational. 
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2. The purpose of the Act is to protect the public, one means 
of such protection is through the registration requirements. 
The major thrust of the Uniform Securities Act is to 
protect the public in its dealings in the securities market. One 
of the ways such protection is furthered is through the Act's 
requirement that all securities offered or sold in this State 
must be registered with the Division. The registration 
requirements provide, among other things, information to the 
public concerning the security and those issuing it. 
3. The distribution of Amenity's stock was 
was not registered with the Division. 
unlawful because it 
exempt. The Act also 
The Act provides that it is unlawful to offer or sell 
any security in this state unless it is registered with the 
Division, or the security or transaction is 
defines "offer," "sell" and "sale" to include every disposition 
of a security for value. 
Appellant claims that Amenity's disposition of its 
stock is excepted from the Act's registration requirements 
because the securities were bona fide gifts to the recipients. 
That is, the distribution of the stock by "bift" is not a sale, 
and therefore, no registration of the securities in such a 
distribution is required. 
Clearly, a "gift" of a security constitutes a 
disposition of the security, and thus it is 
if it is a disposition for value. Case law 
provided in the Act indicate that a disposition by gift can be 
for value, and in this case, the creation of a public corporation 
by gifting securities to 900 individuals is a disposition for 
an "offer" or "sale1 
and two examples 
• 9 -
value. Obviouslyf the gifting of securities for value is 
required to be registered with the Division unless otherwise 
exempted. 
The Act provides that a "good faith gift" is an 
exception to the definition of an "offer" or "sale," and thus, 
appellant claims, it is an exception to the registration 
requirements. Regardless of the accuracy of that claim, 
appellant bears the burden of proving to the Department that what 
Amenity had done constituted a good faith gift in order for 
Amenity to assert that the disposition did not require 
registration. A "good faith gift" is not any and all types of 
gifts—it is a particular type of gift, and the Department has 
the authority to determine what it is pursuant to its legislative 
grant of authority and in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 
Appellant failed to convince the Department that its 
transaction was a good faith gift of securities. It must now 
show that the Department was unreasonable and arbitrary in its 
denial of the claim to the exception. The case law and analyses 
appellant provides fails to show error by the Department in its 
determination that the distribution of Amenity stock was not a 
good faith gift. 
The Department found that Amenity disposed of its 
securities in an effort to circumvent the registration 
requirements of the Act. The Department then concluded that a 
good faith gift is a bona fide gift given in good faith, i.e., 
without intent to circumvent the purposes of the Securities Act 
and its registration requirements. Such a determination is 
- 10 -
reasonable, is supported by case daw, and is an application of 
special law to which reviewing courts are to give great 
deference. 
3. The SAB and the Executive Director have authority to 
suspend all trading exemptions. 
The Legislature determined that the proper manner to 
protect the public in its dealings with the securities market is 
by requiring that all securities disposed of for value must be 
registered with the Division unless otherwise exempted. When 
securities are distributed to the public without such 
registration, the Division has a duty to act quickly and 
L effectively to prevent further trading of the securities. One 
resource provided by the Legislature to protect the public from 
the unlawful trading of illegally distributed securities is by 
suspending any exemptions that might be improperly claimed by one 
attempting to trade such securities. 
Appellant's claim that the Division must wait until an 
exemption is claimed by an individual before it can act to deny 
or revoke such a claim is not founded on any such requirement in 
the statute, and it ignores the practical realities the Division 
faces in its regulation of the securities market. An after-the-
fact attempt by the Division to declare that the person was in 
error when he thought he was trading his securities under a 
proper exemption does too little too late in protecting the 
public. 
Pursuant to the legislative mandate to protect the 
public by the exercise of its authority, toe Division acted to 
protect subsequent purchasers of Amenity's stock by suspending 
• 11 -
all trading exemptions on the stock in Utah. For the Division 
not to so act would be a derogation of its duty to the public. 
Such an act by the Division is clearly within its authority, and 
to prevent the Division from so acting would result in 
substantial harm to subsequent purchasers who act in reliance on 
the expectation that the Division is properly regulating the 
securities market in Utah. The public cannot be as adequately 
and promptly protected in any other way than by the Divisionfs 
action under S 61-1-14(3). 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. APPELLANT MUST SHOW THAT THE DEPARTMENTS 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UNREASONABLE 
The scope of review of the Department's decision by 
this Court is limited to determining whether the administrative 
decision is reasonable and rational and is not arbitrary.2 This 
Court has had occasion to review a decision by the Executive 
Director and the SAB in the case of Technomedical Labs* Inc. v. 
Utah Securities Div.. 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987). In that 
case, this Court set forth the following standard of review 
applicable to this type of administrative decision: 
in Vtah Pep't of ftdfnjp, Servf y, Pufrlic Serv* 
Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)f the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the three standards of 
review to be applied to decisions of 
administrative agencies generally. The standard 
2 While this appeal is from a decision by the district court, 
this Court reviews the administrative decision as if the appeal 
had come directly from the agency. Technomedical Labs. ?nc. v. 
Utah Securities Division. 744 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1987), and 
Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1983). 
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which applies in the instant case is that of 
reasonableness or rationality. Included under 
this standard are agency questions on "mixed 
questions of law and fact" and agency 
interpretations of "special law." "Special law" 
is defined as "the operative provisions of the 
statutory law [the agency] is empowered to 
administer, especially those generalized terms 
that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate 
their interpretation to the responsible agency." 
Jd. at 610. Deference is afforded to the 
expertise and experience of the agency in its 
interpretation of key provisions of a statute it 
is empowered to administer. Under this standardf 
the agencyfs decision will be set aside "only if 
it is outside 'the tolerable limits of reason,' 
or 'so unreasonable that it must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary.1" Id. at 612. (quoting 
silver Beehive Telephone c<?> V> Public Servt 
Comm'n. 30 Utah 2d 44, 46, 512 P . W 1327# 1328, 
(1973); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 29 Utah 
2d 9, 11, 504 P.2d 34, 36 (1972))J 
There is no question that the law|involved in this case 
is "special law," and that "deference is afforded to the 
expertise and experience of the agency in its interpretation" of 
the law; the Legislature specifically indicated such in a note to 
the 1983 Supplement of the Utah Securities Act. Immediately 
preceding S 61-1-1 of the Utah Securities Abtf U.C.A. (1983 
Supp.), the legislature presented the purpose of the Utah 
Securities Division as follows: 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to securities 
a securities division to adminipte 
providing for 
r and enforce 
state securities laws: authorizing the division 
to set registration and examination fees; 
modifying bond requirements for registered broker 
dealers and investment advisors; providing 
summary powers to deny registration applications; 
modifying coordinated filing requirements; 
limiting extension period on summary orders; 
providing End Fpdjfying definition; pipviding and 
modifying exemptions from registration: providing 
for a securities advisory board; increasing 
interest charges for violations brought by 
private litigants; providing additional penalties 
- 13 -
for securities violations; increasing the ceiling 
on criminal fines for violation of securities 
law; and authorizing the division to classify 
specific acts as unlawful. 
See also, Laws of Utah, Chapter 284 at 1108. (Emphasis added.) 
The statutes at issue in this case are clearly within the 
categories provided above, and thus are "special law." 
Regarding the findings of fact by the Department, the 
Utah Supreme Court held in Administrative Services that findings 
on questions of basic fact may be overturned by the reviewing 
court "only where they are 'so without foundation in fact1 that 
they 'must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.1" 658 P.2d at 608 
(emphasis in original). And the findings must be upheld "if 
'there is evidence of anv substance whatever' which can 
reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination made." 
Id. (emphasis in original)• 
Thus, under the above standard of review, this Court 
must uphold the Department's decision unless appellant can 
demonstrate that such decision was not based on any evidence 
whatsoever, was irrational and unreasonable, and was not done in 
pursuit of the Division's legislative purpose of protecting the 
public through the administration and enforcement of the State's 
securities laws. 
POINT II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK VIOLATES 
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT BECAUSE 
IT WAS DISPOSED OF WITHOUT REGISTRATION 
A. Iptrpdpctiop 
Since the review of the administrative decision below 
will be governed by the "reasonableness or rationality" standard 
as indicated above, in order to aid this Court in its application 
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of the test for reasonableness, a brief discussion of the intent 
and purposes of the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("the Act") is in 
order. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Payable Accounting Corp., v. 
McKinley. 667 P.2d 15, (Utah 1983) noted thit -[securities laws 
are remedial in nature and should be broadly and liberally 
construed to give effect to the legislative purpose*" In 
Technomedical Labs, Inct. this Court stated that "Itlhe purposes 
of securities acts in general are to prevent fraud and to 
encourage disclosure of information through registration, thereby 
protecting investors from the sale of fraudulent and worthless 
speculative securities." 744 P.2d at 322. And, in Utah Code 
Itlhis chapter may 
purpose to make 
it and to co-ordinate 
s chapter with the 
curb the activities 
Ann. S 61-1-27, the Legislature stated that 
be so construed as to effectuate its general 
uniform the law of those states which enact 
the interpretation and administration of thil 
related federal regulation." 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in th^ case of State v, 
Borface, 288 N.W. 13, 16 (Minn. 1939) stateq that the clear 
purpose of the Uniform Blue Sky Laws "is to 
of those who by ingenious subterfuge or by fraudulent means seem 
bent on disposing to the ignorant and gullible, fraudulent or 
speculative securities." 
In the case of SEC v. Harwvn Industries Corp.. 326 
J 
F.Supp 943, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) the court noted; 
lilt is readily apparent that the Harwyn spin-
offs violated the spirit and purpose of the 
registration requirements of S 5 of the 1933 
Act, which is to protect investors by promoting 
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full disclosure of information thought 
necessary to informed investment decisions, 
• • • Furthermore, the registration 
provisions are designed not only to protect 
immediate recipients of distributed securities 
but also subsequent purchasers from them* 
(Citations omitted.) 
From the forgoing cases it becomes apparent that the 
purpose of the registration provisions of the Act is to protect 
the public through full disclosure, and that the Act should be 
broadly and liberally construed in order to curb the abuse of the 
registration provisions of the Act through subterfuge or fraud. 
!• Registration Requirements of the Act 
The Act provides protection to the public by requiring 
the registration of securities to be offered or sold in the 
State, or an exemption to such registration must be established. 
Such registration can be carried out through various types of 
disclosure requirements: Sections 61-1-8, 9, and 10 of the Act 
provide three separate vehicles for the registration of an 
initial public offering (IPO); Section 61-1-14 is the section 
dealing with exemptions from registration. 
a. Disclosure Required Under An IPO 
Under the Act, a private corporation that wishes to 
become public can examine and select one of the requirements of 
the three initial registration sections which best coincides with 
the goals and objectives of the company. Typically, all three 
nethods require the disclosure of the following: 
the principles behind the company, their past business 
history, and a disclosure of any significant criminal or 
civil action which has been taken against them; 
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the capital structure of the company with recent financial 
data and disclosure of ownership both before and after the 
public distribution of the security; 
a discussion of the company's business history, business 
purpose, and prospects for the future; 
In addition, any individual obtaining a share of the security in 
the public distribution is required to be furnished a prospectus 
prmation provided the 
relevant information 
order to make an 
ing of material 
adequate disclosure 
and sign a subscription agreement. The inf 
investor in the prospectus must contain all 
that a reasonable investor would require in 
informed investment decision* Both the mak: 
misrepresentations and the failure to make 
are actionable under the fraud provisions of the Act. (See S 61-
1-1) 
After a given registration has b^en approved by the 
Division and become effective, recipients of the initial offering 
can trade the security for up to a year's time. Once the 
registration time period has run, the recipients of the security 
cannot trade the security unless they obtain a trading exemption 
under § 61-1-14. U.C.A. S 61-1-11(8). 
b. Exemptions Frppt Registration Pequirfercents 
Section 61-1-14 provides approximately 28 different 
situations in which the registration requirements of 61-1-7 are 
inapplicable, and subsection 2 of 61-1-14 pertains to some 17 
transactional exemptions which are the type of exemptions 
applicable to this case. Note that there are only three 
subsections within 14(2) that call for additional information to 
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claim an exemption from registration in trading a security, and 
only two of those could be applied in this case: subsection 
14(2)(m) provides for disclosure for trading of the security when 
it is a non-issuer transaction effected by or through a broker 
dealer; subsection 14(2)(b) exemption provides for disclosure 
through recognized securities manuals. But, 14(2)(b) and (m) 
exemptions do not cover all situations in which securities 
trading may take place, and the other exemptions under 14(2) 
(except 2(p)) do not require any disclosure of information. 
The disclosure required in 14(2)(b) and (m) is 
information which supplements and updates the disclosure required 
for the initial registration, and it typically requires only that 
the names and addresses of the principals of the company, the 
name of the registered agent, a brief business history, and a 
recent unaudited financial of the company be provided. 
Thus, the information provided through an exemption 
under subsections 14(2)(b) and (m), is at best limited, because 
it does not call for the same disclosure required in an IPO, 
instead, it calls for supplemental and updated disclosure for 
secondary trading of an already registered security. Given that 
the purpose of the registration provisions of the Act is to 
protect the public through full disclosure, a scheme of 
distribution which creates a public company and avoids the 
requirements of initial registration and its accompanying 
disclosure violates the purpose of the Act. 
2. Whom is Registration to Protect? 
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Appellant argues that by Amenity distributing its stock 
through gifting to a broad range of individuals, the initial 
registration provisions of the Act are inapplicable because the 
initial recipients have not paid anything for the stock received, 
and do not need any protection.3 Such an argument ignores the 
aim of the registration requirements. The court in Harwyn 
indicated that disclosure requirements exist 
purpose than that claimed by appellant: "the| 
provisions are designed not only to protect 
for a broader 
registration 
immediate recipients 
of distributed securities but also subsequent purchasers from 
£h£R*m Harwyn Industries Corp,. 326 F.Supp at 953 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the protection afforded to the public by the 
registration requirements applies to the trading of securities in 
general, not to any particular party involved in the trading. 
3 A significant point is that the anti-frauc| provisions of U.C.A. 
whether or not it is 
S 61-1-1 provides 
S 61-1-1 apply to the trading of a security 
required to be registered. Subsection 2 of 
that it is unlawful to omit to state a material fact in 
connection with the offer or sale of a security. The donees of 
Amenity stock who attempt to trade it under a 14(2) exemption 
would likely be in violation of S 61-1-1 becpause there is no 
information whatsoever available concerning the company that 
enables the purchaser to make an informed investment decision, 
unless the company itself provides the type of information 
disclosed in an IPO to the donees or other buyers. A 
donee/seller will find himself in the difficult position of 
explaining that he supplied all the material facts to the buyer 
that were necessary concerning the security when he attempted to 
sell it, when in fact no information was available. 
It is unlikley that the donees of Amenity stock are aware of 
the applicability of S 61-1-1 to an attempt on their part to 
trade the security (if they are aware of S fol-1-1 at all). In 
the January 20, 1987 hearing, a representative of CGC testified 
that CGC made a concerted effort to reach persons uneducated as 
to investing in securities when it carried put the distribution 
of Amenity and like company stock. (R. 118 Transcript at 31# 35, 
36) 
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The argument presented by appellant shows a callous 
disregard for those who need protection provided by the Act. 
Under the Amenity scenario, the initial recipients of the stock 
are provided no disclosure concerning the company other than that 
which the gifting company may feel compelled to provide. They 
are thus placed in jeopardy when they attempt to sell the 
securities to another because they lack the type of information 
that may be necessary to avoid the anti-fraud provisions of S 61-
1-1• In all likely cases, the sale of Amenity stock by the 
initial recipients will be done without providing the information 
to the purchasers that is necessary for trading, and thus, the 
subsequent purchasers will purchase stock in a company that has 
not had to disclose anything about itself. Or, if trading is 
conducted under a 14(2)(b) or (m) exemption and information is 
provided, it is information of questionable benefit absent the 
information required in the initial registration. Nevertheless, 
the subsequent purchasers of the stock make their purchases under 
the assumption that the stock has passed through the initial 
registration process, and therefore, the necessary steps have 
been taken for public protection. 
The effect of such a dangerous sequence of events has 
already transpired in the present case. After becoming a 
publicly held company by the gifting process, Amenity was merged 
with a private company, Elkin Weiss, Inc. Elkin Weiss maintained 
the name "Elkin Weiss, Inc." and began trading on the secondary 
market. Significant information about Elkin Weiss's background 
was not required to be disclosed in the secondary trading of the 
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Amenity-Elkin Weiss security, such as the pait business history 
of the company, the background of the principals of the companyr 
and whether the principals have a history of 
fraudulent activities, etc. Subsequent pure 
stock purchased it under the assumption that 
registration requirements of a public distri 
such information and inform those making the 
criminal conduct in 
hasers of Elkin Weiss 
the initial 
frution would cull out 
initial purchase of 
the stock. Individuals purchasing in that instance were 
indubitably relying on the State's duty to r egulate the trading 
of securities to protect them from securities with questionable 
backgrounds. The Act surely was not crafted 
actually transpired. 
to allow what 
POINT III. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS 
REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED WITH THE DIVISION BECAUSE 
IT IS AN OFFER OR SALE AS DEFINED BY THE ACT 
In their Final Order, the Department found that the 
gift of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an 
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Act. (R. 19) The 
Department also concluded that no registration of the security 
was sought or granted, and that Respondent failed to prove that 
any exemption or exception such as a ••good faith gift" applied to 
render the security exempt from registration. Id, The Board thus 
concluded that the distribution of the stock of Amenity was in 
violation of the Act. Id. As was stated above, appellant must 
prove that such a conclusion was unreasonable, not rational, and 
that there was no evidence to support the findings upon which the 
conclusions are based. 
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A. The Distribution Of Amenity Stock Constituted An Offer Or 
Pale As Defined By The Act 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-7 states that Milt is unlawful 
for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless 
it is registered under this chapter or the security or 
transaction is exempted under 61-1-14.- Section 61-1-13(15)(a) 
and (b) provides: 
"Sale11 or "sell* includes every contract for sale 
off contract to sellf or disposition of. a 
security or interest in a security for value. 
•"Offer" or "offer to sell* includes every attempt 
or offer to dispose of. or solicitation of an 
offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security fpf value» 
(Emphasis added.) The facts present a situation wherein Amenity 
distributed approximately 90f000 shares of its stock to 900 
persons by giving it to them in order to create a publicly held 
corporation. The Department found that such a distribution 
constituted an offer and sale of a security as defined by the 
Act. (R. 19) While most of the discussion has focused on whether 
the distribution by Amenity was a "sale" as defined in S 61-1-
13(15), in fact, the attempt by Amenity to dispose of the stock 
by gift also constituted an "offer" of a security. 
l. Offer 
Black's Law Dictionary at 975 (5th ed. 1979) defines 
"offer," in part, as follows: 
To bring to or before; to present for acceptance 
or rejection? to hold out or proffer; to make a 
proposal to; to exhibit something that may be 
taken or received or not. To attempt or 
endeavor; to make an effort to effect some 
object, as, to offer to bribe, in this sense used 
principally in criminal law. 
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(Emphasis added.) Thus, the act invuiveu m 
Amenity's stock to the 900 recipients constituted an offer of the 
tiitr y x v i n g Of 
security. It certainly was an attempt to di 
security. (The discussion concerning whether 
value11 can be by gift shall be addressed later.) In addition, in 
order for one to give something to another, 
spose of the 
a "disposition for 
the gift must be 
offered, and if the gift is to consummate, t|he offer of the gift 
must be accepted by the recipient. Nothing |in the facts of the 
case indicate that the recipients of Amenity's stock were forced 
to receive and accept the stock? that they tfad no choice in the 
matter. It is clear that the giftees could 
gift (or the offer of the gift) of stock or 
either accept the 
reject it. Thus, the 
offer to give the stock was a presentation for acceptance or 
rejection, or an exhibition of the security that could be taken 
r 
or received or not, and was thus an "offer to dispose" according 
to the definition provided above. If the disposition by Amenity 
involved an offer, S 61-1-7 requires that the security be 
registered with the State. The acceptance pf the argument here 
that the gifting of Amenity stock involved 
the issue raised by appellant that a gift c 
thus no registration was required for the d 
requires registration for an offer as well 
securities. However, the consummation of the gift of Amenity 
stock by the offerees acceptance of the offer constituted a sale 
as defined by the Act. 
2. £ai£ 
n offer leaves behind 
annot be a sale, and 
istribution; the Act 
as the sale of 
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Regarding the question of whether the disposition by 
Amenity constituted a "sale,* one should bear in mind that the 
terms "sale" and "sell" are to be broadly construed. In 
interpreting statutes virtually identical to U.C.A. $ 61-1-
13(15)(a), courts have held: 
These terms "sale" and "security" are to be given 
liberal construction. United States v. Moniar* 
47 F.Supp 421, 426(12) (D.C.Del. 1942, aff'd. 147 
F.2d 916 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. 325 U.S. 859, 65 
S.Ct. 1191, 89 L.Ed 1979. 
The term "sale" or "sell" is not limited to 
technical common-law sales, or transactions 
ordinarily governed by the commercial law of 
sales. Spector v. L.O. Motor Inns. Inc., 517 
F.2d 278, 286, (5th Cir. 1975), Dasho v. 
Susquehanna Corpft. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. 
den. 389 U.S. 977, 88 S.Ct. 480, 19 L.Ed.2d 470 
(1967). 
Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank 228 S.E.2d 
334, 338, 139 Ga.App. 405 (1976). 
Clearly a gift of a security is a disposition of the 
security. Black's Law Dictionary defines "disposition" to be the 
"lajct of disposing; transferring to the care or possession of 
another. The parting with, alienation of, or giving UP 
property." Black's Law Dictionary at 423 (5th ed. 1979) 
(emphasis added). In addition, other cases have held the word 
"disposition" in various statutes to include a transfer by gift: 
£££, e.g. Bayer v. United States 382 F.Supp 576, 580 (N.D.Ohio 
1974)i Litch v. People ex rel. Town of Sterling, 75 P 1079, 1080, 
19 Colo.App. 421 (1904). 
Hence, a "gift" of a security constitutes a disposition 
of the security, and thus it is a "sale" within the definitions 
provided in S 61-1-13(15)(a) if it is a disposition of the 
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security for value. Appellant argues that a gift cannot be a 
sale; that the Act in no way contemplates th^t a gift could 
constitute a sale. However, S 61-1-13(15)(cj provides a number 
of "examples" of what would constitute a sale of securities, and 
the first two examples presented are dispositions of securities 
by gift. (See, 61-l-13(15(c) (i) : "any bonus siiL£li;" and (ii): "< 
purported gift of assessable stock.") 
B. Distribution Of Amenity Stock Was A Disposition For Value 
value. (R. 19, 23, 
A significant question here is whether the distribution 
of stock by Amenity was a disposition for value. The Department 
determined that there was a disposition for 
30) Its determination was that value was rejceived because the 
distribution was done for the "creation and/or maintenance of 
good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of [CGCl's 
business in various areas represents the valt 
10.C.A. § 61-1-13(15)(a) and (b)l. See lifidj 
ElAi_# 156 So.2d 550 (1963); King et. al. vsJ 
ue envisioned by 
kburn Yt IpppUto 
Southwestern Cotton 
Oil Co.. Okla. App., 585 P.2d 385 (1978). (R. 30) 
that disposition of Cases that support the conclusion 
Amenity stock was done for value are not lacking. Perhaps the 
most compelling case to support this finding is Technomedical 
Labs. Inc. In Technomedical. this Court cited two federal cases: 
S.B.C. v. Harwyn Industries (cited supra), imd g,ptC» V. 
Datronics Engineers. Inc.. 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973) as 
support for its affirmation of the Department's decision. While 
the issue in Technomedical was whether "benefit11 was received by 
the company creating spin-offs, in fact, thp cases relied on by 
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this Court pertain to the question of "value" in the same sense 
being addressed here: what constitutes a disposition "for value" 
and thus, a sale requiring registration. Technomedical stated 
the following: 
In Datronics and Harwyn. the courts were asked to 
decide if the distribution of a subsidiary's 
unregistered shares as a dividend to the parent's 
shareholders constituted a "sale" requiring 
registration under the Federal Securities Act of 
1933 C1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 77b. Whether a 
"sale" had occurred depended upon whether the 
<3istrit?vtion wes "for Yalv*ef" poth courts held 
value would be gained by the creation of a public 
market. Datronics. 490 F.2d at 253-54; Harwyn, 
326 F.Supp. at 952-953. Such value includes: 1) 
an enhanced ability to borrow; 2) an enhanced 
ability tQ raise equity; 3) the availability Qt fl 
jnetfrod of valuing eggetg; 4) »P ?Pfrapcefl 
liquidity Of gpgets? ppfl 5) the ppegtige 
associated with publicly held companies. The 
Department concluded the term "value" in Harwyn 
and Datronics is substantially synonymous with 
••benefit" in the instant case. 
744 P.2d at 324 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the disposition of the stock by gifting to 
some 900 shareholders resulted in the creation of a public 
corporation, and thereforef value was received. Amenity greatly 
benefited from the public distribution of the stock. Not only 
was goodwill created or maintained as acknowledged by Petitioner, 
but Amenity received the value of becoming a public company 
without the disclosure or the restrictions of the registration 
process. As a public company, Amenity received enhanced ability 
to borrow money, raise capital and became a ripe target for 
acquisition. In addition, CGC received $25,000 as commission 
from the merging of Amenity with Elkin Weiss, and also received 
approximately 300,000 shares of Elkin Weiss stock, which was 
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trading at one point for about $3.00 a share. Thus, value was 
received by its distribution. Appellant cannot in any way 
demonstrate that such a conclusion by the SAB was unreasonable. 
c* Appellant's Cages Are Npt Analogous An<V0r Are Not Applicable 
Appellant disputes the claim that a gift is a 
disposition for value in that appellant views the category of 
•gift" to be beyond the reach of the statute 
several cases in support of his theory. App 
, and he cites 
ellant's perspective 
on the issue of gift v. sale is fatally flawed and the cases 
cited by appellant are not analogous to this case. 
For example, appellant relies heavily on an early Utah 
Supreme Court case, Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.?d 938 (Utah 1935), as 
support for his analysis that a gift is simply not a sale, nor 
can it be. There are some serious problems with appellant using 
the Andrews case as support for his position. One problem is 
that the facts in Andrews are significantly different than the 
present case. In the Andrews case, the gift of treasury stock 
took place because the company intended on levying assessments on 
the stock to finance the development of its' 
Neither the aim nor the effect of the distr: 
a publicly held company. In the present case, it is irrefutable 
that the purpose of the gifting of the stock was to create a 
public corporation (to be discussed below). 
Another problem is the potential 
to the public that can occur from a broad reading of the Andrews 
decision as urged by appellant. The dissenting opinion in 
Andrews spends a great deal of time on the issue of the problems 
mining property, 
ibution was to create 
for s ignif icant harm 
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inherent in the giving of assessable stock to the public, the 
potential for fraud created thereby, and the belief that the 
gifting of assessable stock is a disposition for value. 49 P.2d 
at 943-945. The following statement by Justice Hanson in his 
dissent expresses his feelings about the harmful applications of 
the Andrew? decision. 
tilt is clear that the disposition of the copper 
company's stock, as alleged, would be a sale for 
value within the definition of that term as 
stated in • • • the Blue Sky Law. Certainly such 
a disposition was an attempt to dispose of a 
security for value. It may be conceded that a 
gift of stock does not come within the purview of 
the Blue Sky law. But, as herein shown, to call 
the arrangement described in the complaint a 
bestowing of gratuitous issues of stock, is 
begging the question and fails to distinguish 
between form and substance. |f this court gives 
legal sanction to such a plain and palpable 
attempt to evade the intent and purpose of our 
constitutional snd statutory prpyisiPPPr then 
indeed will the doors be wide open to every one 
yfrp mey resort to the specious expedient Qt 
making "gifts* of stock. The law would be 
nullified: the legislative regulations intended 
.to protect the public, ypuid be inpperative; and 
additional impetus would be given to the ever 
present tendency to invent means to circumvent 
gycfr regulations* 
49 P.2d at 945. 
No more persuasive statement could be made by the 
Division than that made by Justice Hanson that such attempts to 
evade statutory requirements ought to be struck down. While in 
the present case the 6tock given to the public was not 
assessable, the intent to circumvent the legislative requirement 
of registration is just as palpable. Fortunately, the 
potentially disastrous result that could be felt by the ftpdrews 
case should courts construe it in the manner urged by appellant 
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was thwarted by the changes the Leaislature made to S 61-1-13 of 
the Act in 1963 and in 1983. 
In spite of what appellant claims, the statute 
applicable at the time of the Andrews case is not the same as it 
is today4 , and the amendments to that statute prove a 
Legislative intent to overrule the Andrews decision. The fact in 
Andrews relevant to the changes made in the amendments of the Act 
is that the type of stock given out by the company in Andrews was 
assessable stock. In its enactment of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act in 1963# the Legislature, in giving the 
definitions to the Act provided that "A purported gift of 
assessable stock is considered to involve an offer or sale." 
U.C.A. S 61-1-13(10)(d) (1965 Supp.) Such an amendment was 
clearly enacted to overturn the ruling by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Andrews. If there was any ambiguity in that statute as 
drafted by the 1963 Legislature, the 1983 Legislature eliminated 
any question as to its possible interpretations by providing 
that: MA purported gift of assessable stock 
as is each assessment levied on the stock.N 
13(14)(c)(ii) (1983 Supp.) (emphasis added. 
Legislature also amended 61-1-13 to exclude 
of sale a -good faith gift." U.C.A. S 61-lh 
Supp.) provides "The terms defined in subsections (a) and (b) do 
i£ an offer or sale, 
U.C.A. S 61-1-
) The 1983 
from the definition 
-13(14) (d) (i) (1983 
not include: (i) A good faith gift.11 It is clear that the 
* The Utah Uniform Securities Act was not adopted by this State 
until 1963, and thus, much of the policy applicable to the 
Uniform Securities Act was not applicable to the Utah statute in 
effect in 1935. 
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amendment to the definitional section of the Act by both the 1963 
and 1983 Legislatures is pointed directly to the Andrews 
decision. 
In his brief, appellant spends considerable time on the 
"plain meaning" doctrine of statutory construction to support his 
claim that the plain meaning of the statute does not contemplate 
that a gift is a sale. The above discussion clearly indicates 
that the Legislature did intend that a gift could constitute a 
sale because it specifically provided for examples in which gifts 
are sales, and it provides a type of gift excepted from a sale. 
Additional support for the conclusion that Andrews was 
overruled is found in the rule of statutory construction that 
requires a presumption of legislative intent to overrule 
conflicting case law when statutes are amended: 
The general rule of statutory interpretation 
that a provision in an act is to be read in its 
context, is applicable to the interpretation of 
amendatory acts. '• • • 
The legislature is presumed to know the prior 
construction of the original act or code and if 
previously construed terms in the unamended 
sections are used in the amendment, it is 
indicated that the legislature intended to adopt 
the prior construction of those terms. . . . 
If the section as amended is inconsistent 
y.ith prior judicial interpretation of related 
sections. It is presumed that the legislature 
Knew iti and the amendment controls^ 
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.35 at 296 (4th ed. 1985 
rev.) (footnote references omitted). Thus, appellant's reliance 
upon Andrews places him in the unenviable position of arguing a 
case specifically overturned by legislative amendment. 
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Appellant may claim that the effect of overruling 
Andrews related to the issue of assessable stock only. However, 
it is clearly more logical to conclude that he issue overruled 
by the amendment dealt with the attempt to circumvent 
registration requirements by gift, because, 
was an exception to the general rule specifically created by the 
good faith gifts1 
1983 Legislature. Thus, the legislature did not want to require 
the registration of all types of gifts, as could be interpreted 
by the amendment, so it gave an exception to the general rule and 
excluded good faith gifts. As will be discussed below, the 
distribution by Amenity of its stock was not 
The other cases relied on by appellant regarding this 
a good faith gift. 
case. Appellant 
S.D.N.Y. 1948), and 
issue are wholly inapplicable to the present 
cites Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp. 387 (i 
Shaw v. Dreyfus. 172 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1949), as support for his 
assertion that gifts of securities cannot constitute sales 
requiring registration. However, neither case involves a 
situation remotely related to the present case; the statute and 
issues involved have nothing to do with the 
securities. Rather, suits by stockholders of the corporations 
registration of 
from the subsequent 
of the respective 
were based was 15 
were commenced to recover corporate profits 
sales of stock warrants issued to employees 
companies. The statute on which both cases 
O.S.C.A. S78p(b), 16(b) Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
That statute pertains to unlawful trading on insider information 
and the obtaining of profits from the sales! 
on the information. 
of securities based 
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Additionallyf in fiixdiir 'the gift to which the term 
"sale" did not apply happened to be the donation of the warrants 
by the employee to various charities. Such a situation—that of 
donating publicly traded stock by an individual to a charity— 
would not be a sale for which registration is required under the 
present statute either. Another glaring difference between the 
facts in those cases and the present case is that the companies 
involved were publicly held corporations, and the stocks were 
readily traded on the market. In those cases, the effect of 
distributing warrants to employees did not create a publicly held 
corporation. 
Thus, appellant has failed to provide this Court with 
cases to support his own hypothesis that disposition by gifts are 
excluded from registration requirements within the Act. Even if 
appellant had cases to support such dogma, this Court would not 
overturn the Department's Order unless appellant could show by 
such cases that the Order was irrational and unreasonable. 
POINT IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS NOT 
A GOOD FAITH GIFT AND THUS WAS NOT EXCEPTED 
FROM THE DEFINITION OF OFFER OR SALE 
A. Appellant Has Burden To Show Disposition Was Excepted From The 
Definition of Offer Or Sale 
Since the gifting of Amenity stock was a disposition 
for value, appellant bore the burden of demonstrating to the 
Department that the stock or the transaction was, nevertheless, 
exempt or excepted from registration, or the distribution would 
be in violation of the Act. As stated in Utah Code Ann $ 61-1-
14.5: •'the burden of proving an exemption under S 61-1-14 or an 
exception from a definition under § 61-1-13 is upon the person 
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claiming the exemption or exception." The ohly exemption or 
exception Amenity laid claim to was the "good faith gift" 
exception provided in 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) , which provides: "The 
terms defined in Subsections (a) and (b) [of 61-1-13(15)1 do not 
include: (i) a good faith gift; • . .." 
1* Appellant Failed To Show Findings By Department Were 
Without Foundation In Fact 
In order to succeed on this issue before this Court, 
Appellant must show that there was no evidence presented to the 
Department to support its finding that "[tine distribution of the 
Amenity stock was done with an intent to circumvent or frustrate 
the purposes of the • . • Act. (R. 18) Appellant claims the 
decision by the SAB to deny appellant's claim to the "good faith 
gift" exception is not supported by the evidence, and he 
enumerates a number of factors in the recor< 
the gifts were done in good faith. Appellant Brief at 24. 
However, appellant's demonstration that Amenity 
presented some self-serving evidence that the gifting of the 
stock was done with good intentions misses the whole concept 
behind the aim and purpose of the Act. The Act does not concern 
itself in this setting regarding good faith with the sincerity of 
the giver but whether there has been an intent to evade the 
requirements of the law. Appellant must show that the 
Department's determination that the law was intentionally evaded 
is baseless. As is pointed out in Administrative Services* the 
d demonstrating that 
standard of review applicable to an administrative body's finding 
of fact is that such findings must be upheld if there is 
"evidence vt ?ny ewfrgtance whateverr* and £an only be overturned 
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if -they are *BQ without foundation in fact' that they 'must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary.*m 658 P.2d at 608 (emphasis in 
original)• 
The finding by the SAB that the distribution of stock 
was done to circumvent the Act was based in part upon the facts 
presented at the hearing specifically called for by the SAB in 
order to provide Amenity an opportunity to prove its claim to the 
good faith gift exception. The additional evidence received at 
the hearing on January 20, 1987, combined with the findings of 
fact adopted from the original hearing, clearly provided the 
Department with more than "evidence of any substance whatever•" 
The evidence in support of such the finding that the 
gifting was not done in good faith is as follows: Amenity was 
formed in January of 1986, and on the day of its formation, CGC 
purchased 1,000,000 shares of stock from Amenity for $2,000 and 
became its sole shareholder (R. 28); shortly thereafter Amenity 
disbursed approximately 90,000 shares to 900 individuals (R. 29); 
no registration was sought or obtained for the distribution of 
the stock, and thus by avoiding the initial registration process, 
Amenity was able to become a public company without disclosure 
(R. 118 Transcript at 17); CGC had incorporated approximately 30 
other companies during the same period of time and caused them to 
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of 
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity (R. 118 Transcript 
at 18, 30); the shareholders who received the gifts were 
generally the same individuals, the names of which were obtained 
from a list of CGC's clients (R. 118 Transcript at 30, 31); 
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Amenity Inc., and two additional companies were acquired through 
merger by private companies (R. 118 Transcript at 18, 20); CGC 
was instrumental in the acquisition of those three companies by 
the acquiring companies, and CGC received $25,000 for the 
services it performed for each acquisition, and received 300,000 
shares of Elkin Weiss stock which was trading at the time of the 
Transcript at 27) 
hearing to indicate 
January 20 hearing at $3.00 a share. (R. 118 
The SAB viewed the evidence presented at the 
that the gifting process committed by Amenity was not done in 
good faith. 
It should be remembered that this is not the typical 
gift situation arguably envisioned by 61-1-13(15)(d)(i). We do 
not have the case of a grandfather giving his grandson a stock 
certificate, nor do we have a case of a company giving its 
employees stock which had previously been registered in order to 
award performance. Amenity was a private corporation until it 
publicly disbursed the stock. It was the act of public 
distribution of the stock that changed Amenity from a private to 
a public corporation. The stock was not, nor had it ever been, 
registered. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support the 
finding that the distribution of the Amenity stock was "done with 
an intent to circumvent or frustrate the pu 
Uniform Securities Act and the registration 
therein,* and hence, the finding must be upheld. 
2. The Conclusion By The Department Tftat 
rposes of the Utah 
provisions contained 
The good Fg**h Gift 
Exception Did Not Apply To Amenity Distribution Was 
Reasonable 
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In its conclusions of law in the Order dated January 8, 
1987, and as reiterated in its Final Order, the SAB provided what 
it determines the term "good faith gift" found in S 61-1-
13(15(d)(i) to mean: 
We find as a matter of law that the term "good 
faith gift" in the context in which it is used, 
i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a 
bona fide gift of securities given in "good 
faith," i.e. not given with an intent to 
circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act and, most relevant to the 
instant case, the registration provisions 
contained therein. 
(R. 23) Clearly, the fact that CGC had created over 30 companies 
and distributed them to the general public in similar fashion to 
Amenity indicates a scheme to circumvent or frustrate the 
registration requirements of the Act, and therefore was not in 
good faith. 
Appellant continues to claim that the "good faith gift" 
exception simply requires that the security be given for free, 
without any strings attached. While that may be his opinion, 
such an analysis fails to indicate the irrationality or 
unreasonableness of the Department's conclusion. Since this is 
an area of special law, *[d]eference is afforded to the expertise 
and experience of the agency in its in its interpretation" of the 
statute. Technomedical Labs, Inc.. 744 P.2d at 323. And, hence, 
the Department's interpretation can "be set aside 'only if it is 
outside "the tolerable limits of reason," or "so unreasonable it 
Bust be deemed capricious and arbitrary."1" Id. Thus, unless 
appellant can set forth some reasons or point to some law 
indicating the unreasonableness or irrationality of the 
Department decision, he cannot have the decision overturned. 
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The following cases demonstrate a generally accepted 
interpretation of the phrase "good faith* refers to an intention 
to comply with the law, and lack of good fail 
intent to circumvent the law. For example: 
th indicates an 
"Good faith means 
not acting with the intent improperly to circumvent the warrant 
requirement 
• • . United States v> Eunklei^ 679 F.2d 187, 191 
(9th Cir. 1982); "[Tlhis amendment was not 
subterfuge to evade the holding of the A&P case, but rather as a 
good faith endeavor to conform to the technical requirements of 
Sections 8(a)(3) • . .." Nat'l Labor Relations Board v. Bakery & 
promulgated as a 
Confectionary Workers. 245 F.2d 211, 213 (3*d Cir. 1957); -The 
evidence before the Court is that CCWD acted in good faith and 
without intent to evade the usury laws when it entered into the 
1981 transaction." In Re Pillon-Davey & Associates 52 B.R. 455, 
461 (N.D.Cal. 1985); M[A] transfer or reassignment which is not 
made in good faith and is intended to subve 
Teacher Tenure Act is in effect removal . . 
Peterson. 421 F.Supp 950, 952 (N.D.I11. E.D 
jet the intent of the 
•* PanPQ Vt 
. 1976); "ITlhe job 
abolishments were not made in good faith and were used to subvert 
the civil service system.* State, ex rel. gpvld et altr Vt Qhig 
Bureau of Employment Services. 501 N.E.2d 648, 650, 28 Ohio 
App.3d 30 (1985). In Windljpg y, CunflUlr 
(Wyo. 1977) , the Wyoming Supreme Court def il 
honest, lawful intent, the condition of acting 
without knowledge of fraud or without intent to 
assist in a fraudulent or otherwii 
scheme • • • • 
568 P. 2d 888, 890 
ned "good faith* to be 
se unlawful 
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'Good faith consists of an honest intention to 
abstain from taking advantage of another, even 
through the forms or technicalities of the law, 
together with an absence of all information or 
belief of facts which would render the 
transaction unconscionable.1 
(Citations omitted.) Applying these definitions in concert with 
the purpose of the registration provisions of the Act, i.e. to 
protect the public through full disclosure, and considering that 
the Act should be broadly and liberally construed in order to 
curb the abuse of the registration provisions of the Act through 
subterfuge and fraud, it becomes evident that the SAB's 
interpretation not only "falls within the limits of 
reasonableness and rationality," but is the only legitimate 
conclusion the SAB could make in carrying out its statutory duty 
to protect the public. 
POINT V. UTAH SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD AND THE EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR HAVE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND ALL REGISTRATION EXEMPTIONS 
As was stated above, the Legislature determined that 
the proper manner to protect the public in its dealings with the 
securities market is by requiring that all securities disposed of 
for value must be registered with the Division unless otherwise 
exempted from registration. If the registration provisions have 
not been complied with, the trading of the unregistered 
securities is unlawful, and the Division has a duty to protect 
the public through the means provided it by statute. 
Section 61-1-14(3) is one of the resources the 
Legislature provided the Division in order for the Division to 
protect the public from the unlawful trading of securities. 
Section 61-1-14(3) authorizes the SAB, in conjunction with the 
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Executive Director, to suspend the trading exemptions of a 
security which are in violation of the Act. 
portions of S 61-1-14(3) provides as follows 
The pertinent 
Upon approval by the executive director and a 
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
executive director may by order deny or revoke 
any exemption specified in Subsections (1)(h) or 
(l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with respect to: (a) 
a specific security, transaction or series of 
transactions; or (b) any person or issuer, any 
affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or 
any entity subsequently organized 
of a person or issuer generally. 
by or on behalf 
No such order 
may be entered without appropriate prior notice 
to all interested parties, opportunity for 
hearing, and written findings of tact and 
conclusions of law, except that the division may 
by order summarily deny or revoke!any of the 
specified exemptions pending the final 
determination of any proceeding under this 
subsection. . • . The executive director may not 
extend any summary order for more than ten 
business days. 
Appellant claims that 61-1-14(3) ban only be exercised 
by the Division after someone has claimed one of the exemptions 
Such a perspective 
pvided therein, and 
Division in its 
under section 14 in trading the security, 
reads into the statute a requirement not pre 
ignores the practical realities facing the 
regulation of the securities market. 
If a security has gotten into the hands of the public, 
and it is not a lawfully distributed security because it was not 
registered as required by law, there are some characteristics 
that weaken the alleged value the security might have. Those 
characteristics are not usually discoverable by the general 
public, and thus, the public needs to be protected from it. Some 
of the obvious problems with such a security is that since it has 
not been registered, the significant information otherwise 
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provided that would indicate the questionable worth of the 
security is not available for public safety. In addition, the 
value of the security may be questionable because of the legal 
problems attached to the illegality of the distribution. Civil 
action by the Division or other parties against the company is 
likely to take place in the future, and the value of the security 
because of that action will be weakened. 
Appellant believes the Division cannot activate its 
powers under S 61-1-14(3) until a person holding the security 
chooses to trade it and at some point is required to justify any 
exemption she might have claimed. The Division's duty to protect 
the public from the potential harm one may receive from 
purchasing such a security is no less viable or compelling simply 
because the person selling the security has not chosen to inform 
the Division of her intention to claim the exemption. The 
unsuspecting public is unaware of the problems inherent with an 
unregistered security, and assumes the Division has done its job 
to require that all securities available in the market have been 
registered by the Division or are otherwise exempt. 
Unless those involved in the market are aware that the 
security involved cannot be lawfully traded because no exemptions 
are available from such trading, the initial recipient may sell 
the security to another without ever informing the Division of 
any claims to an exemption she might make. The Division, after 
the fact, then, has to find out about the transaction, try and 
retrace the steps of the transaction, and seek some sort of 
remedy to rectify the situation. Appellant's argument concerning 
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the proper application of subsection 14(3) amounts to a claim 
that the Division cannot shut the door to the henhouse until all 
the chickens are out* And then, once the chickens have flown the 
coop, the Division can merely say to the party who traded the 
security that he had no legal right to trade it. By the time the 
Division has acted under such a scenario, the security is already 
in the hands of one who has paid for it based upon the false idea 
that it was lawfully traded. 
In fact, the above scenario has happened in this case. 
By the time the Division found out about what CGC did with 
Amenity and the 47 other companies it created, a large number of 
those companies had been merged with private 
stocks in those companies had been traded on 
companies and the 
the secondary 
market. Because of the mergers, no background information about 
the private companies was made available to the public. Those 
having purchased the stock on the market have bought securities 
with some significant problems attached to them, among them the 
questionable worth of the security now that the Division has 
taken action against the companies involved.1 The ones harmed are 
the ones now holding the security. 
Section 14 is an attempt by the Legislature to provide 
the Division with an ability to stop the trading of a security 
when there is some problem with the type of 
security itself. There are various situations in which exemption 
denials can take place, of which this case is clearly one, 
Summary Orders pf the Pepartment 
transaction or the 
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Appellant is dead wrong in his claim that the Division 
cannot summarily suspend the exemption and then hold a hearing on 
the propriety of the action after the suspension has been 
ordered. (See Appellant Brief at 34, 35.) That is specifically 
what 61-1-14(3) provides: "the division may by order summarily 
deny or revoke any of the specified exemptions pending the final 
determination of any proceeding.» but for not more than ten 
business days. (Emphasis added.) The Division has, in fact, 
issued summary orders under appropriate circumstances in other 
cases. The power granted the Division by the Legislature to take 
summary action and later conduct a hearing is specifically 
addressed to the problem discussed herein. In other words, if 
the Division deems that summary action is warranted to protect 
the public, the Division can deny any exemption that might be 
claimed when it deems that the situation warrants it, and then 
the Division must conduct a hearing to prove the propriety of the 
action. 
If appellant is nonplussed at this type of authority, 
he must be unaware of similar authority held by other regulatory 
bodies. (For example, TRO's granted by district courts apply a 
similar type of authority, and summary suspension authority is 
given to the Division of Occupational and Pofessional Licensing 
to suspend a controlled substance license if there is imminent 
danger to public health or safety. A hearing on the merits of 
the suspension is required in that instance as it is in this 
case. U.C.A. 5 58-37-6(4)(d).) In certain circumstances, the 
State needs to be provided with the power to prevent or stop the 
42 -
harm that is or can imminently be perpetrated upon the public 
without having to deal with the delays inherent in the due 
process rights of a hearing* The requirements of due process are 
then promptly applied to insure the rights of the accused. 
Pursuant to the legislative mandate to protect the 
public by the exercise of its authority, the Division acted to 
protect subsequent purchasers of Amenity's stock by suspending 
all trading exemptions on the stock in Utah* For the Division 
not to so act would be a derogation of its duty to the public. 
Such an act by the Division is clearly with^ **« authority* and 
to prevent the Division from so acting would result in 
substantial harm to subsequent purchasers who would otherwise 
purchase the stock in reliance on the expectation that the 
Division is properly regulating the trading 
the State of Utah. 
The Division has alleged and demonstrated that the 
distribution of Amenity stock violated S 61-}l-7 of the Act. The 
failure to register the distribution of the 
and future stock holders of the Amenity stocl 
not having received the disclosure contemplated by the Act. The 
Division must act in every way it can to protect the public from 
potential harm of transacting in illegal and questionable 
securities. In order to protect the public! the SAB and the 
Executive Director had no choice but to suspend trading in order 
to stop the continued exchange of Amenity stock without 
sufficient disclosure. A section of the Act had been violated 
and, pursuant to Section 61*1*14(3), it was 
of securities within 
stock placed present 
k in a position of 
well within the 
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authority of the SAB and Executive Director to order the 
suspension* 
CPNCT.PSIQP 
It has been established that the Executive Director's 
Final Order in this case is rational and reasonable and is based 
upon compentent, material and substantial evidence. Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate error by the Executive Director in such 
Order. The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to 
affirm the Order by the Department suspending all trading 
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc., its affiliates and 
successors. 
DATED this 7 day of March, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
WVfjLxkM B.4?cKEAN/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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DAVID H. DAY 
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